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The rn.  'tor vehicle industry in the Philippines is  tion of resources to relatively high-cost activi-
regulated and protected by the provisions of  ties. Eliminating all of the restrictions overnight
development programs for cars, commercial  may lead to adjustment problems, but gradual
vehicles, and motorcycles. Each program virtu-  liberalization could limit these problems.
ally prohibits the import of completely built-up
vehicles, specifies minimum local content  The proportion of domestic content required,
requirements for vehicles assembled in the  the percentage of compensatory exports required
country from imported completedly knocked-  for kits, and the tariff rates on kits could be
down kits, and requires that firms assembling  lowered in stages, according to a preannounced
kits export to earn foreign exchange to cover the  schedule, to allow gradual adjustment. The
cost of the kits.  prohibition on imports of assembled vehicles
could be replaced by a tariff and phased out
Similar protective regimes have existed in a  gradually. To avoid proportionately more
number of countries, especially in Latin  protection of the assembly industry, the tariff on
America.  finished autos could be phased out more quickly
than the other tariffs, to avoid sending false
Takacs develops a model to illustrate the  signals to the domestic industry about the
economic impact and welfare cost of import  direction of adjustment.
prohibitions, local content requirements, and
export requirements. She applies that model to  To avoid increasing the effective rate of
Philippine data.  protection on assembly operations during
liberalization, elimination of the domestic
Her results indicate that the protective  content and compensatory export requirements
regime in the Philippines imposes substantial  should be accompanied by decreases in the tariff
costs on consumers and encourages the alloca-  rates on assembled vehicles.
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is to get these findings out quickly, even if presentations are less than fully polished.  The findings, interpretations, and
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The  motor  vehicle  industry  in the  Philippines  is regulated  by and
protected  by the provisiXons  of three  development  programs: The  Car
Development  Program  (CDP),  which  covers  passenger  vehicles;  the  Commercial
Vehicle  Development  Program  (CVDP),  which  covers  trucks  and busses;  and  the
Motorcycle  Development  Program  (MDP).
Although  the  details  of the  CDP,  CVDP,  and  NDP differ,  each program
virtually prohibits the importation of completely built-up  (CBU)  vehicles,
specifies  minimum  local  content  requirements  for  vehicles  assembled  within  the
Philippines  from  imported  completely  knocked-down  kits (CKD),  and also
requires  that firms  assembling  kits  export  to earn foreign  exchange  to cover
the  cost  of the imported  kits.
Similar  protective  regimes  have  been  used in a number  of countries,
especially  in Latin  America. 1 The  set  of restrictions  taken  together  affect
both  the sales  price  of the finished  vehicles  and  the cost  conditions  of
domestic  assembly  operations. The  restriction  on imports  of assembled
vehicles  drives  up the domestic  prices  of motor  vehicles,  encouraging  domestic
production,  but  the local  content  requirements  and  export  requirements
increase  the cost  of production  for  assembly  operations. The  protective
regime  and  regulations  impose  costs  upon consumers  and  misallocate  resources,
encouraging  high-cost  domestic  production.
The  purpose  of this  paper  is  to develop  a  model  to illustrate  the
economic  impact  and  welfare  cost  of the import  prohibition,  local  content
requirements,  and  export  requirements,  and  apply  that  model  to Philippine  data
to generate  rough  estimates  of the  cost  to the  country  of maintaining  this
type  of protective  regime. The  paper  is organized  as follows: section  II
explains  the  details  of the three  motor  vehicle  industry  programs;  section  III
develops  a  model  to illustrate  the  impact  of the protective  regime;  section  IV
uses  that  model  to explain  the transfers  among  groups,  inefficiencies,  and  net2
welfare  costa  arising  from  the  protection;  section  V explains  the calculation
of these  costs  and  transfers;  and section  VI applies  the  model  to Philippine
data.  Section  VII investigates  the impact  of the  removal  of just the  domestic
content  and  compensatory  export  requirements,  leaving  tariffs  unchanged.
Section  VIII summarizes  the  paper  and  offers  conclusions  and policy
recommendations.
11 . TIN  MOTOR  VEHICLE  PROTECTIVE  REGIME  IN THE  PHILIPPINES
The  origins  of the Philippine  motor  vehicle  assembly  industry  can  be
traced  back  to 1949,  when a shortage  of foreign  exchange  led  the  Philippine
government  to impose  foreign  exchange  controls. The foreign  exchange  controls
denied  foreign  exchange  to "nonessential"  items,  including  passenger  cars.  By
1951,  firms  began  assembling  passenger  cars in  the Philippines  from imported
sets  of components,  or "kits". Another  foreign  exchange  crisis  in the  early
1970s  prompted  the  government  to further  regulate  the industry  via the
Progressive  Car  Manufacturing.  Program  (PCMP)  and  the  Progressive  Truck
Manufacturing  Program  (PTMP),  which  became  effective  as of 1973.  These
programs  prohibited  importation  of completely  built-up  vehicles  (C8U),  and
imposed  local  content  requirements. In 1984,  the PCMP  was revised  to add
export  requirements  that  required  firms  assembling  cars  to earn foreign
exchange  by exporting  automotive  industry  products  to compensate  for  the
foreign  exchange  used  to import  kits.
The new  administration  which  took  power  in 1986  replaced  the PCMP and
PTMP  with  the  Car Development  Program  (CDP)  and  the  Commercial  Vehicle
Development  Program  (CVDP),  as well as a  similar  Motorcycle  Development
Program  (MDP). Patterned  after  the  earlier  protective  regime,  these  programs
*continued  the  local  content  requirements,  export  requirements,  and  ban  on
imports  of CBU  vehicles  that  compete  with  domestic  production.  The local
content  requirements  differed  by type of vehicle  and  increased  year-by  year.
The  content  requirements  by type  of vehicle  can  be  found  in  Table  1.  Firms
assembling  cars  must  earn 50%  of the foreign  exchange  needed  to import  kits3
and  firms  assembling  commercial  vehicles  must  earn 25%  of the  foreign  exchange
needed  to import  kits.  At the  beginning  of the  program  in 1988,  exports  could
be either  automotive  or non-automotive  products,  but exports  of automotive
products  were  encouraged. Credit  for  non-automotive  exports  is being
gradually  phased  out, so that  by 1993  only  exports  of automotive  products  will
qualify  for  the  compensatory  export  requirements. The schedule  for  phasing  in
the  requirement  for  automotive  industry  exports  can  be found  in Table  2.
III.  A  MODEL OF  THE  MOTOR VEHICLE  PROTECTIVE  REGIME
This section develops a model to assess  the  impact  of  the  import
prohibitions,  domestic  content  and  export  requirements  and  the interactions
among  them.  The  model  simplifies  by ignoring  differentiation  among  types  of
components,  the  trade-off  between  domestic  content  and compensatory  exports
allowed  in  the regime,  regulations  on minimum  disassembly  of components  in
kits,  and  prohibitions  against  importing  certain  components. The  model  also
assumes  a small  importing  country  with  competitive  components  and assembly
industries 2, and assumes  that  the  domestic  content  requirements  and  all
export  requirements  are  binding (that  is,  less  domestic  content  would  be used
by assembly  firms  if there  were no domestic  content  requirements,  and  exports
of auto  industry  products  would  be less  than  the  observed  values  in  the
absence  of export  requirements).
If the  country  imposing  the  domestic  content  and  compensatory  export
requirements  is small,  the  world  price,  or import  price,  of assembled  autos
(PA*)  and  of auto  components  (Pc*)  can  be taken  as given. Assume  that  there
is  only  one  type of finished  or assembled  automobile,  made through  a  process
of assembling  a given  number,  "a",  of components. For  the  moment,  ignore
differences  among  components. 3 A perfectly  competitive  domestic  components
industry  manufactures  components  and  a perfectly  competitive  domestic  industry
assembles  vehicles  by combining  packages  of imported  componants,  called  "kits"
with  domestically  produced  components.  Assembly  firms  must  earn a given
percentage,  xK,  of the foreign  exchange  necessary  to import  the  kits  by4
exporting  auto industry  products. Equilibrium  price.  and  quantities  in  the
market  for  Assembled  autos  and in  the  market  for  components  will  be determined
jcintly  because  they are  tied  together  not  only  by the normal  input-output
relationships,  but also  by the domestic  content  and compensatory  export
requirements.
The  Domestic  Market  for  Assembled  Autos
Given  the prohibition  on imports  of assembled  vehicles,  the  price  of
vehicles  will  be determined  by domestic  demand  and supply. Suppose  that  the
quantity  demanded  (Q2)  is a  decreasing  function  of the  price  of a vehicle
(PA):
QD  - D (PA)  D' negative  (1)
On the supply  side,  suppose  that  there  is an upward  sloping  supply
function  of value-added  in domestic  assembly  operations,  in which  the quantity
of vehicles  firms  are  willing  to assemble  increases  as the value-added  per
unit (V)  increases 4, an in (2):
-v  . V (Q)  VI positive  (2)
where  QA is the  quantity  of finished  autos  produced. Suppose  that  the
assembly  technology  requires  a certain  number  of components,  "a"  per  auto.  Let
"6"  be the  proportion  of total  components  that  must be of domestic  origin. 5
If 20 percent  domestic  content  is  required,  then 6-0.2. Let XK  be the
compensatory  export  requirement  for  kits,  that is,  the  propottion  of the  value
of the imported  kit that  must  be compensated  by exports.  Then  a(l-6)Pc*  is  the
value  of a kit  at world  market  prices. Given  the compensatory  export
requirements,  the  value  of compensatory  exports  required  to import  the  kit
would  be x!,a(l-6)PC*=PCgC,  where  qc is the  quantity  of compensatory  exports
required  to import  one  kit.  The  tariff  on kits  would increase  the cost  of
kits  to the  domestic  assembly  industry  by the  tariff  revenue  that  would  have
to be paid  per  kit, or a(l1 6)Pc*tK. The  cost  of domestic  components  would5
equal  a6Pc.  The  assumption  of a perfectly  competitive  assembly  industry
implies  that in  the long-run  unit cost  equals  price,  so:
PA  a(l-6)PC*(l+tK+xK(PC-Pc*)/Pc)  -a6Pc  + V(Qj)
Let  na(Pc-Pc*)/Pc*  be the  percentage  by which  domestic  components  prices
exceed  imported  components  prices.  The above  equation  can  'then  be written:
PA - aPc*(l.6)(l+t  C xKf) +  aPc*6(1+w)  +  V(QS)  (3)
Equation  (3)  can  bo thought  of as  the long-run  assembly  industry  inverse
supply  curve.  Supply  price is  the (vertical)  sum  of the  domestic  value-added
that  would  be required  for  firms  to be willing  to assemble  various  quantities
of vehicles,  the cost  per vehicle  of domestic  components  used as intermediate
input.  (aPc*6(1+ir))  and  the effective  cost  of the imported  kit  which  would
equal  aPc*(l-6)(l+tK+xKw).
If importation  of already  assembled  vehicles  is  prohibited,  then the
interaction  of demand  and  the supply  of vehicles  from  domestic  assemblers  will
determine  market  price. The equilibrium  in  the domestic  market  would  occur
where  the  quantity  demanded  equals  the  quantity  supplied:
O-A  '  Q3  (4)
Equations (1)-(4) determine PA,  #  QA and V, given PC, Pc*, tKD XA, XK,
a  and 6.
The  market  for  assembled  autos  is  depicted  graphically  in  the  upper
quadrant  of Figure  1.  The demand  curve  for  assembled  vehicles  is shown  by DA.
The  supply  curve  of the  domestic  assembly  operations  is shown  in Figure  1  by
SA.  As explained  in  more detail  in  the section  on the costs  of  protection
below,  SA is the  vortical  sum  of the supply  curve  under  free  trade (SA*),  the
increase  in  assembly  industry  costs  per  vehicle  due  to the  tariff  (aPc*(l-
6)tK),  and  the increase  in  costs  attributable  to the  domestic  content  and
compensatory  export  requirements  (aPc*(6u+(1-6)xKir)).
Given  the  domestic  supply  and  demand  conditions,  the  equilibrium  price
of autos  in the  domestic  market  would  be determined  where  the  quantity
produced  (QA)  equals  quantity  demanded. The domestic  price (PA)  is  not6
constrained  by the price  of a vehicle  in  the  world  market  (PA*)  because
imports  are  prohibited.
The  various  elements  of the  protective  regime  influence  the  market  for
assembled  vehicles  in  potentially  contradictory  ways.  The import  prohibition
increases  the price  of the finiahed  vehicle  to the consumer. Higher  finished
vehicle  prices  encourage  greater  output  from  domestiq  assembly  operations,  but
or the  other  hand  the  domestic  content  and  compensatory  export  requirements
for  kits  and  the tariff  on kits  discourage  domestic  assembly  operations  by
increasing  input  costs. This  shows  up as an  upward  shift  in the supply  curve
for  vehicles  assembled  within  the  country.
The  Domestic  Market  for  Components
Assume  that the  perfectly  competitive  domestic  components  industry  has  a
supply  curve  for  components,  given  in inverso  form  by:
PC  S(Qc)  SI positive  (5)
where  Qc is the  quantity  of components  supplied  by the  domestic  industry.
The  demand  for  domestic  components  includes  the  demand  for  components  to be
combined  with imported  kits for  domestic  assembly  (aSQA)  and  exports  of
components  as compensatory  exports  for  the  importation  of kits (XK).  Given
the compensatory  export  requirements, PcXK&  xKa(1- 6)PC*QA,  so the  demand  for
components  to export  to qualify  to import  kits  will be xKa(l- 6 )(PC*/Pc)QA,  so
the  total  demand  for  components  can  be expressed  ass
Qc  XKa(1-6)QA(PC*/PC) + a6QA  (6)
Equations  (5)  and (6)  determine  Pc'  and  QC,  given  QA  PC*^,  XK, a, and 5.
The  equilibrium  in  the  market  for  components  is  depicted  graphically  in
the  lower  quadrant  of Figure  1.  The  supply  curve  of the  domestic  components
industry  is shown  by SC.  The  demand  curve  for  components,  Dc,  is the
horizontal  sum  of the  demand  for  components  by domestic  assemblers  (a6QA),  and
the  demand  for  components  for  export  to satisfy  compensatory  export
requirements  for  imported  kits (xKa(l-6)QA(PC*/PC))  Equilibrium  in the7
components  market  would  occur  at the  price/quarntity  combination  Pc and  QC.
Under  free  trade,  domestic  producers  wouid  be forced  to match  the  world
market  price  of components  PC*  at which  price  components  production  would  be
QC  *  Both  the domestic  content  and compensatory  export  requirements  act  to
increase  the demand  for  components  produced  withln  the  country,  driving  up
price  and  production.
Given  the linkage.  between  the  markets  for domestic  components  and
assembled  vehicles,  equations  (l)-(6)  jointly  determine  the  endogenous
variable.  PA,  D  QS  V,  PC,  and  QC given  the  world  market  components  price
Pc,  the technical  coefficient  a and  the  policy  parameters  tK,  xK,  and 6.  The
equilibrLum  prices  and  quantities  in both  markets  would  be determined
simultaneously.
IV.  TRANSFERS AMONG  GROUPS  AND NET  COST OF  THE REGIME
If there  were no  protective  regime,  and  abstracting  from  transportation
costs,  the  world  market  prices  of both assembled  autos  and components  would
prevail  withln  the respective  domestic  markets. In  the components  market,  a
quantity  QC*  would  be produced  at the  price  PC*.  The  domestic  assembly
operations  would  have  access  to components  at this  price,  so their  supply
curve  would  be the vertical  sum  of the value-added  per unit  required  for  each
output  level  and  the cost  of component  inputs,  aPC*.  This supply  curve  is
shown  by SA*  ln the  top  quadrant  of Figure  1.  At the  free-trade  price  PA*,
the  domestic  industry  would  assemble  QA*  units,  consumers  would  purchase  DA*
units,  s0 (DA*-QA*)  assembled  vehicles  would  be imported.
The cbsts  of the  entire  protective  regime  can  be assessed  using  the
free-trade  equilibrium  as a benchmark  for  comparison. The  tariff  on kits,
domestic  content  requirements  and  c.-pensatory  export  requirements  increase
input  costs  to assemblers,  and  thus shift  their  supply  curve  upward  from  SA*
to SA.  This upward  shift  can  be decomposed  into  the cost  increase  per  unit
assembled  due  to the  tariff,  aPC*(l-6)tK (equal  to the  distance  ef in Flgurea
1),  and  the  upward  shift  due  to the  domestic  content  and  compensatory  export
requirements  aPc*( 61r)+(l- 6)xKn (equal  to the distance  be in Figure  1).  Let
SA'  show  the industry  supply  ourve  with the  tariff,  but  without  the domestic
content  and compensatory  export  requLrements. thus  the shift  from  SA* to  8 '
represents  the impact  of the  tariff  on kits,  and  the shift  from  SA'  to 8A
represents  the impact  of the  domestic  content  and compensatory  export
requirements.
The  welfare  costs  can  be measured  as the  effects  of dietortions  in  the
markets  for  assembled  vehicles  and  components. The  coat  to consumers  of the
restrictions  is area abed,  the  reduction  in consumer  surplus  as compared  to
free  trade. Of this,  area  bcg is the  traditional  deadweight  loss  in
consumption  due  to higher  assembled  auto  prices.
The  compensaWry export  requlrements  for  kits and  the  domestic  content
requirements  shift  up the  assembly  industry  supply  curve  from  SA'to  SA (-be)'
so,  at  the resulting  domestic  level  of assembly  operations  QA, area  aboh
represents  the  extra  cost  of components  to assemblers  because  of the  existence
of these  restrictions. The increased  cost  to domestic  assemblers  of area  abeh
is in  part a  transfer  to domestic  manufacturers  of components  and in  part a
deadweight  efficiency  loss.  To see  how  the  area is  divided,  note  that area
abeh  in the  upper  quadrant  of  Figure  1  equals  area ijkl  in  the lower  quadrant
of  the same  diagram. 6 Area ijml  represents  a transfer  to the  domestic
components  manufacturers  in  the form  of higher  profits,  and  area jkra
represents  a deadweight  loss  due to the  excess  of production  costs
domestically  over the  price  at which  the  components  could  have  been  purchased
in the  world  market,  for  the  extra  output  mk produced  because  of the  domestic
content  requirements  and  the  compensatory  export  requirements  for  kits. 7
Area nfqd  represents  an increase  in  profits  to domestic  assembly
operations  due to the  net effect  of the  entire  protective  regime. Area fgq
represents  a production  deadweight  loss,  the  extra  cost  of assembling  QA-QA*9
vehicles  within  the  country  rather  than  buying  them in the  world  market  at
PA*.
To summarize  the  net  welfare  effect  of all  of the restrictive  measures
taken  together,  the regime  imposes  looses  on consumers  equal  to area  abcd.
This  lus  can  be subdivided  into  transfers  to the  government,  the ausembly
industry,  the  components  manufacturers,  and  deadweight  losses  due  to
inefficient  production  in the  assembly  and  components  industries. Area nfqd
represents  a transfer  to domestic  assemblers  of autos  and fgq  represents  a
deadweight  loss  due  to inefficient  assembly  operations. Area hefn is  a
transfer  to  the government  in the form  of tariff  revenue  on kits.  Area  abeh
(equal  to area  ijkl)  represents  a transfer  from  consumers  to domestic
components  manufacturers,  which  in  turn can  be divided  into  increases  in
producer  surplus  or ehort-run  profits  of ijml  plus deadweight  production  loss
of area  jkm. Area bog is the  deadweight  loss  due to the  consumption
distortion  in the  market  for  assembled  autos. The  net effect,  ignoring
transfers,  is a consumption  loss  of  bog, and  production  deadweight  losses  of
fgq  and jkm  in  the assembly  and components  industries,  respectively.
The  transfers  from  consumers  to both  the  domestic  assembly  and the
domestic  components  iniustry  show  that  both  assemblers  and  manufacturers  of
components  can  gain from  the  protective  regime,  but in  some respects  their
interests  are  contradictory. From  the  point  of view  of the  manufacturers  of
domestic  components,  the  more  restrictive  the  domestic  content  and
compersatory  expo.t  requirements,  the greater  their  gains.  From  the point  of
view  of the  domestic  assembly  industry,  the  mor* restrictive  the  regime  on
imported  assembled  vehicles  the  greater  their  gains.  However, the  more
restrictive  the  domestic  content  requirement  (the  higher  6)  and  the  more
seiere  the  compensatory  export  requirements  for  kits (the  higher  XK),  the
smaller  will be the  gains  to domestic  assembly  operations. Note  that  the
assemblers  need  not  necessarily  gain  on balance  from  the  regime. Sufficiently
high 6,  tK,  and  XK,  relative  to the import  restriction  on assembled  vehicles,10
could  leave  the  domestic  assemblers  with a net lose  and,  on balance,
discourage  rather  than encourage  domestic  assembly  of automobiles. 8
V.  APPLICATXON  TO THE  PHILIPPINES
The  magnitude  of the  areao  in Figure  1 identified  above  as net  welfare
losses  and  transfers  from  the entire  protective  regime  can  be calculated  for
the  Philippines  based  on the actual  values  of the  policy  parameters  tK,  xK and
6,  and  observed  values  of other  variables  for  the  motor  vehicle  industry. The
method  uued for  quantifying  the  magnitude  of the losses  and  transfers  is
explained  in  Appendix  A.  Separate  calculations  were  made for  the Car
Development  Plan (CDP)  and  the Commercial  Vehicle  Development  Plan (CVDP).
The  values  of the variables  and  parameters  used in the  calculations  are shown
in  Table  3.  A detailed  explanation  of the sources  of the  data used can  be
found  in  the  Data  Appendix.
Table  4 presents  the estimates  of the  magnitude  of the lose  to buyers  of
vehicles,  the  transfers  to the domestic  assembly  and  components  industries,
and  the efficiency  losses,  or net  costs,  of the protective  regime. These
estimates  should  be thought  of as rough  approximations  of the  potential
magnitudes  of the  costs,  not as exact  estimates. They  are  based  on assumed
values  for  elasticities  of demand  and  supply,  not  values  estimated  from
Philippine  data,  and,  as explained  in  the data  appendix,  the  values  of some
parameters  for  care  had  to be borrowed  from  the values  for  commercial  vehiclee
for  lack  of data.
The  results  indicate  that the  cost  of the  protective  regime  to
purchasers  of motor  vehicles  in 1990  was  about  5.2  billion  pesos (USS215
million)  per  year.  This  was roughly  equivalent  to almost  US$4000  per vehicle
assembled  domestically.  The assembly  industry  and  the  components  industry
benefitted  from  the  protective  regime,  gaining  1.8  billion  pesos (USS  73
million)  and  1.2  billion  pesos (USS  50  million),  respectively. The  deadweight
efficiency  losses  exceeded  1.2  billion  pesos (US$50  million),  or about  22,000
pesos  (USS90S)  per  vehicle.11
VI.  LIBERALIZATION  AT CURREN TARIFF  RATES
The calculations  in the  previous  section  estimate  the  cost  of the  entire
protective  regime,  including  tariffs,  domestic  content  requirements,  and
compensatory  export  requirements.  These  costs  are  the  gains  that  could  be
achieved  by moving  to completely  free  trade. This scenario  is,  however,
unlikely,  as tariffs  are  likely  to remain  after  other  forms  of protection  are
eliminated. A relevant  question  iss  what  would  be  the  impact  of eliminating
the  domestic  content  and  compensatory  export  requirements  at current  tariff
rates  for  assembled  vehicles  and  kits?  The  welfare  impact  of eliminating  the
domestic  content  and compensatory  export  restrictions  can  be assessed  by
calculating  the size  of the transfers  and  net  costs  under  the  tariff  regime
and  comparing  the result  with  those  calculated  in  the previous  section  for  the
entire  protective  regime.
Eliminating  the  embargo  on imports  of assembled  vehicles  would  allow
unlimited  imports  of vehicles  at the  present  tariff  rate.  The  price  of
vehicles  to consumers  would fall  to the import  price  plus  tariff  paid,  or
PA*(l+tA),  where  tA is the  ad valorem  tariff  on assembled  vehicles. The
markets  for  assembled  vehicles  and  for  components  under  the  tariffs-only
regime  are illustrated  in  Figure  2.  At the  tariff  rate  tA,  the  domestic
vehicle  price  would  be PA*(l+tA). DA vehicles  would  be sold,  of which  QT
would  be assembled  within  the  country  and (DT-QT)  would  be imported. The
consumer  surplus  loss  attributable  to the  tariff  on assembled  vehicles  would
be area  rscd,  of which  scg  would  be a deadweight  consumption  loss.
On the  production  side,  if the  domestic  content  and  compensatory  export
requirements  were abolished,  assembly  firms  would  be free  to import  components
at the  world  price,  so the  price  of components  would  fall  to PC*(l+tK).
Production  of components  would fall  to Q.  The lower  components  cost  would
reduce  assembly  industry  costs  and  shift  their  supply  curve  down  to ST.  ST
lies  above  SA*  by the  extra  cost  of components  per  vehicle  due  to the  tariff,
aPc*tK. At the  prevailing  price  for  assembled  vehicles  under  the  tariff
structure,  PA*(l+tA),  the domestic  industry  would  assemble  QT  vehicles.12
In the assembly  industry,  the  deadweight  loss from  domestic  production
at costs  above  the  world  market  price  under  the tariff  regime  would  be area
uvq.  Area  wuqd represents  extra  profits  of the assembly  industry  above  those
it  would  earn  under free  trade. This represents  a  transfer  from  consumers  to
assembly  firms.  In the  components  industry,  the deadweight  loss  under  the
tariffs-only  regime  would  be yzm,  while  the transfer  to components
manufacturers  would  be xyml.
The transfers  and  costs  of protection  resulting  from  the hypothetical
tariffs-only  regime  appear  in Table  S.  The  method  of calculating  these
figures  is  also explained  in  Appendix  A.  Eliminating  the domestic  content  and
compensatory  export  requirements  but  maintaining  current  tariff  rates  would
benefit  purchasers  of vehicles. The  consumer  loss  would  drop from  5.2  to 4.8
billion  pesos.  The  decrease  is  not  very  dramatic  because  the  tariff  rate  is
fairly  high (50%  on cars  and  an average  46%  on commercial  vehicles). The
estimates  indicate  that  the switch  to a tariffs-only  regime  would  greatly
benefit  the assembly  industry. The  cost  of components  would  drop
significantly,  increasing  the  effective  rate  of protection  to assembly
operations,  increasing  the  transfers  to the assembly  firms,  and  increasing  the
efficiency  losses  from  the  assembly  operations. In  contrast,  the  transfers  to
the  components  industry  would  be almost  halved,  and  the efficiency  losses  from
domestic  components  production  cut  by approximately  60%.  This  result  implles
that  an elimination  of the domestic  content  and  compensatory  export
requirements  should  be accompanied  by a tariff  cut on assembled  vehicles  to
increase  the  gains  to purchasers  of vehicles  and  prevent  an increase  to the
effective  rate  of protection  to assembly  operations.
VII.  CONCLUSIONS
The  motor  vehicle  protective  regime  in the Philippines  is  made up of a
complicated  set  of regulations. Imports  of assembled  vehicles  are  prohibited,
with  certain  exceptions. Imports  of sets  of components  (kits)  to be assembled
within  the  country  are  subject  to tariffs. Firms  are constrained  with  respect13
to the number of models produced and the amounts of imported versus domestic
components used.  Assembly firms that want to import kits must export
automobile industry products equal to given percentages of the value of kits.
The model developed to analyze the impact of the protective regime
indicates that the tariff on kits, the domestic content requirements,
compensatory export requirements, and the prohibition on imports of finished
vehicles  keep vehicle prices high, maintain high-cost domestic production of
both vehicles and components, and transfer large sums to special interest
groups.
The protective regime drives up the price of finished vehicles to
consumers.  The consumer loss is  in part a transfer to the domestic producers
in both the assembly and components industries in the form of higher profits,
and in part efficiency losses, or net losses, due to the distortion of
consumer decisions and production levels.
The various elements of the protective regime affect domestic assembly
operations in different, and potentially contradictory, ways.  Higher finished
vehicle prices encourage greater output from domestic assembly operations, but
on the other hand the domestic content and compensatory export requirements
for kits and the tariff on kits discourage domestic assembly activity by
increasing input costs.  On balance the net effect could either discourage or
encourage domestic assembly operations, depending upon the net impact of the
regulations.  In the case of the Philippines, the protective regime appears to
encourage domestic assembly, so part of the consumer loss from higher prices
represents a transfer to the assembly industry, and part represents an
efficiency loss due to increased domestic assembly of vehicles at a higher
cost than the price of assembled vehicles in the world market.
The domestic components producers are unambiguously helped by all of the
elements of the protective regime.  The tariff on kits provides them with
protection from imported componentG, the import restriction on assembled
vehicles helps maintain domestic assembly operations and the domestic demand
for components, the domestic content requirements force domestic assembly14
operations to use domestically produced components, and the compensatory
export requirements for the importation of kits increases the demand for
domestically produced components for export.  The compensatory export
requirements in fact act 1P-.e  an export subsidy to the components industry.
All the elements of the protective regime act to increase the demand for
components produced within the country and drive up both price and output in
the market for domestic components.  Part of the consumer loss from higher
finiahed vehicle prices thus takes the form of a transfer to domestic
components manufacturers, and part represents an efficiency loss corresponding
to the extra cost of producing components within the country that could be
obtained at lower cost in the world market.
Preliminary estimates of the magnitude of these effects indicate that
the protective regime imposes a loss on Philippine purchasers of vehicles of
about 5.2 billion pesos per year (US$215  million), while transferring roughly
3.0 billion pesos  (US$123  million) to domestic assembly operations and
components manufacturers.  The estimated net loss to the country is
approximately 1.2 billion pesos (US$51 million) per year.  These estimates
must be considered tentative because the model assumes a competitive industry,
does not include some aspects of the protective regime, does not consider the
differentiated nature of both autos and components, and suffers  from lack of
complete data.
Despite these caveats, the results indicate that the protective regime
imposes substantial costs on consumers and encourages the allocation of
resources in activities that are relatively high-cost.  Eliminating all of the
restrictions overnight may lead to adjustment problems, but these can be
limited by gradual liberalization.  The major parameters of the system,
specifically the percentage of domestic content required, the percentage of
compensatory exports required for kits, and the tariff rates on kits could be
lowered in stages according to a preannounced schedule to allow gradual
adjustment.  The prohibition on imports of assembled vehicles could be
replaced by a tariff, and phased out gradually.  During the process of15
liberalization  care should  be taken  not  to inadvertently  increase  the  degree
of effective  protection  to the  assembly  industry  by, for  example,  phasing  out
tariffs  and  domestic  content  and  compensatory  export  requirements  on kits
faster  than the  tariff  on finished  autos.  Doing  so could  temporarily  increase
the  costs  of protection  and  provide  false  signals  to domestic  industry
concerning  the  direction  of adjustment  by temporarily  further  encouraging
domestic  assembly  operations.
The results  of calculations  of the impact  of eliminating  the domestic
content  and compensatory  export  requirements  at 1991  tariff  rates  indicate
that  the change  would  have  benefitted  consumers,  but  would  have increased  the
effective  rate of protection  to assembly  operations  because  of the substantial
decrease  in components  costs. To avoid  increasing  the  effective  rate of
protection  to assembly  operations  during  the liberalization,  elimination  of
the  domestic  content  and  compensatory  export  requirements  should  be
accompanied  by decreases  in the  tariff  rates  on assembled  vehicles.16
ENDNOTES
1.  See Lloyd  (1973) for a description of the Australian system.  Munk
(1969)  provides a survey of Latin American cases.  For descriptions of
the Brazilian, Argentinean, and Mexican protective regimes for
automobiles, Bee Mericle  (1984,  pp. 29-32), Jenkins (1985, pp 55-61),
and Bennett and Sharpe  (1985),  respectively.  For Uruguay, see Takacs
(1991).
2.  The assumption of competition in the automobile industry may be less
unrealistic for the Philippines than for most developing countries.  In
the Philippines there are 10 car assembly firms and 26 commercial
vehicle assemblers.  The model in this paper is intended to clarify the
protective effects of and interactions between the domestic content and
compensatory export requirements and provide rough estimates of the
order of magnitude of the potential costs of the protective regime.
Future work to take into account strategic interactions among firms
could provide a richer analysis and possibly more accurate estimates of
the true costs.
3.  This approach is similar to Grossman (1981) in that it assumes that
domestic and imported components are perfect substitutes. Mussa  (1984)
develops a model in which domestic and imported input  a.re  less than
perfectly substitutable.
4.  This approach is similar to that used by Corden (1971), Chapter 3.
5.  Grossman (1981) shows that the domestic content requirements will have
different effects if defined in terms of physical quantities or value-
added.  The Philippine local content requirements can be treated as
similar to a restriction in quantity terms.  The contribution for each
part is based on "points", equal to the ratio of the FOB CKD price of
the part to the CKD full pack price of the vehicle model.  The
valuations are based on world prices, not domestic prices, so increases
in domestic parts prices will not reduce the quantity of domestic parts
required to fulfill the domestic content requirements.
6.  abeh =  aPc* (ir6  +  (1-6)xKn)  QA
=  aPC*  {6((PC-PC*)/PC*)  +  (1  6)XK(PC-PC*)/PC*)  QA
- a QA (6  +(16)XK)  (PC-PC*)
- ijkl
7.  It is interesting to note that the portion of the demand for components
that arises because of the compensatory export requirements acts like an
export subsidy.  This subsidy element to components exports was at times
explicitly recognized by multinational firms.  Bennett and Sharpe (1985,
p. 186) report that Chrysler arranged for its Mexican assembly
operations to transfer funds to its U.S. assembly operation to cover the
extra cost of Mexican parts.
8.  In this light it is interesting to note that the prohibition of imports
gives a higher protective effect the greater is domestic demand for
vehicles.  During the economic downturn in the early 1980s in the
Philippines  (which  would have decreased domestic demand and decreased
the ad valorem equivalent protection to the assembly industry)
affiliates of Ford, Isuzu, and Toyota all shut down operations and
pulled out of the Philippines.17
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APPENDIX  A
The  magnitude  of the areas  in  Figure  1  that represent  the  transfers  and
losses  due  to the protective  regime  can  be estimated  for  the  Philippines  based
on the  actual  values  of the  policy  parameters  tK,  xK and 6, and  observed
values  of other  variablee  for  the  motor  vehicle  lndustry.
The  consumer  less  was identifled  as area abed  in Flgure  1.  Let * -(PA-
PA*)/PA*  be the percentage  by which  the  prlce  of domestically  assembled
vehicles  exceeds  the  price  of equivalent  foreign  vehicles,  and  qDA  be the
elasticity  of demand  for  assembled  vehicles. Then,  given  that
Area  abcd  - (PA-PA*)QA  +1/2 (PA-PA*)(DA*-QA)
- PA*QA + 1/2  0 PA* (dQA/dPA  PA/QA)  QA/PA  PA*Q
=  (0/(1+0))  PAQA  +  1/2 (0/(l+0))PAQAIDA(0/(l+0))
(0/(il+0))  VA (1  +  1/2  'IDA(O/(l+))  (7)
where  VA if the  value  of domestic  motor  vehicle  output.
The  deadweight  loss  in consumption,  area  bcg, would  bes
Area bcg =  1/2 (PA.PA*) (DA*QA)
- 1/2  0PA(1/(1+0)QAV1DA(0/(l+0))
- 1/2 (0/(1+0))2  VA,oDAo
The  galn  to the  assembly  industry  (area  nfqd)  and  the  deadweight  lone  to
the  economy  from  excess  assembly  operations  (area  fgq)  can  be calculated  by
first  noting  that  the height  of each  'of  these  areas  equals  the  net impact  of
the restrictive  regime,  that ia,  the  amount,  net  of cost increases,  by which
revenue  per  vehicle  assembled  exceeds  free-trade  revenue  per unit.  Lot  this
distance  (fg)  be designated  Ns
N =  (PA-PA*)  -aPC*(l- 5 )tK  -aPC*[ff +(l- 6 )XKWJ
Let  a - aPc*/PA*  be the  share  of components  production  in  tho final  cost  of a
finished  vehicle. Then:
N  =  PA  (1/(1+0))  (0-o`(l-6)tK+(1-6)XYVr+5ff)J.19
Let  V* (-I(1-)  PA*)  be value-added  per  unit under  free  trade,  'SA  be the
elasticity  of the supply  of vehicle  assembly  with respect  to value  added,  and
note  that (QA-QA*)  - eSA(QA/V)N.  Then,
Area fgq  - 1/2  N(QA-QA*) - 1/2  N2 eSA  (QA/PA*)
- 1/2 N2eSA QA  ( 1 +0)/PA  (8)
The  gain  to the assembly  industry,  area nfqd,  can  be calculated  as area
nfgd less  area fgq,  ort
Area nfqd - QA N - 1/2 N2 4SA QA(1 +0)/PA  (9)
Let  eSC  be the  elasticity  of sroply  of components,  and  Vc be thi.  value  of
domestic  components  production. The  deadweight  loss  from  excess  production  in
the components  industry  is  shown  in Figure  1  as area  jkm.
Area jkm  - 1/2 (PC-PC*)(QC-Qc*)
- l/2fPc*eSc(Qc/Pc)Pc  wr/(l+w)
- 1/2  Vc esC  (r/(1+wr)) 2 (10)
The  transfer  to the domestic  components  industry  as a  result  of the protective
regime  is area ijml,  which  equals  atea ijkl  less  the  deadweight  loss
Area ijml  - (PC-Pc*)Qc  - 1/2  Vc  Esc  (W/(I+f))2
- (a/(1+v))VC  - 1/2  Vc csc(ff/(l+ff)) 2 (11)
Equations  7 through  12  were used  to calculate  the  estimated  costs  and
transfers  associated  with  the Philippines  motor  vehicle  protective  regime.
Separate  calculations  were  made for  the  Car  Development  Plan (CDP)  and  the
Commercial  Vehicle  Development  Plan (CVDP). The  values  of the  variables  and
parameters  used in  the calculations  are shown  in Table  3.  A detailed
explanation  of the sources  of the  data  used can  be found  in  Appendix  B.
The impact  of eliminating  the domestic  content  and  compensatory  export
requirements  at current  tariff  rates  can  be assessed  by calculating  the
transfers  and  costs  that  would  result  from  a  tariffs-only  regime  at current
tariff  levels,  and  comparing  these  with the  transfers  and  costs  of the  current
protective  regime.  The  transfers  and  losses  from  the  tariff,  identified  in20
the  text,  can  be quantified  using  procedures  similar  to those  above  for  the
current  protective  regime.
The  consumer  los  can  be calculated  ass
area  r8cd - PA*tADT  + 1/2  PA*tA(DA*DT)
- PA*tA [QA+VDAQA  (t-tA)/(  1+0))+1/2 PA*tAnDAQAtA(l/(3+'))
- VA(tA/(l+O))  ll+nDA(O-tA)/(l+O)l  +  1/2  VA VDA(tA/(1+O))2  (12)
Of this,  the  deadweight  loss  in consumption  would  be:
area seg  - 1/2  VA qDA(tA/(1+0)) 2 (13)
To calculate  the transfers  and  costs  associated  with assembly  operations  under
the  tariff  regime,  denote  distance  uv as M, where
M =  PA*tA-a.PC*tK (PA/( 14+))  (tA-atK)
then  area  uvq  =  1/2  M (QA-QA*T
* 1/2  PA/(l+O)(tA-ctKI  eSA  QA (tA7atK)
- 1/2 6SA  VA  (1/(1+0)](tA°-ctK) 2 (14)
The  transfer  to the  assembly  industry  under  the tariff-only  regime  would  be
area  wuqd:
area  wuqd - M QT  - area  uvq
- M  [QA  - SSA  QA/PA* (N-M))  - area uvq
Given  that (N-M)  = PA( 1/( 1 +4))(tA-otK)  0-o(,Fr+(l- 6)XKn- 6tK)-tA],
area wuqd =  VA( 1/(  1+O))  (tA-atK)  (l-ESA{0-o(ff 6 +(l- 6)Xicw- 6 tK)-tA})
- 1/2  6 SA VA [1/(1+0)1(tA-OtK) 2 (15)
The transfer  to the  components  producers,  area  xyml,  and  the  deadweight
efficiency  lows from  extra  components  production,  yzm, can  be calculated  ass
area yzm  =  1/2  PC*tK[QI-Qc*)
- 1/2  esc  Vc (tK/(1+10)) 2 (16)
and  ares xyml - area xyzl - area yzm
PC*t,Qc  - 1/2  ssc  Vc (tK/(1+fl)) 2
- Vc(tK/(l+vr))(l+esc(tK-t)/(l+ur))  - 1/2  L'sc  VC (tK/(1+ff)) 2 (17)21
The  tariff  revenue  collected  under  the  current  protective  regime,  T0
(from  kit imports  only),  and  under  the tariff  regime,  Tl (from  imports  of both
kits and  assembled  vehicles),  can  also  be estimated:
To  - aPc*(l-6)tK  - o(l- 5 )tK  PA/( 1 +O)
T, =  area read - area  qcg  - area uvq - area wuqd  aPc*tk  (18)
- area rucd - area  cg  - area uvq - area wuqd - otKPA/(l+O)  (19)22
APPENDIX  B
Calculation  of costa  and  transfers  due  to the  motor  vehicle  protective
regime  in the  Philippines  requires  information  on prices,  production,  price
differentials  between  domestic  and  world  prices,  tariff  rates,  and some
information  on costs. Not all  of this information  is readily  available. This
appendix  explains  the sources  used,  rationale  for  the  specific  values  used
when alternative  estimates  were available,  and assumptions  used  when it  was
necessary  to assume  values  for  particular  parameters. The  year 1990  is
chosen  as the  base year  of comparison.
VARIABLE  EXPLANATION  AND SOURCES  USED
Percentage  by which  domestic  vehicle  prices  exceed  world  market
prices  for  equivalent  models.
Sources:
CVDP:  The  nominal  rate  of protection  associated  with QRs on
trucks  and  buses  is calculated  at 52.7%  in CRC, 1991,  Table  A (p.
139)  In the  absence  of specific  equivalent  information  for
passenger  vehicles,  the same  value  was  used for  passenger
vehicles.
,-  Percentage  by which  domestic  components  prices  exceed  world  market
components  prices  under  the  protective  regime.
There  is  no data currently  available  on this  measure.  The
regulations  specify  that  domestic  components  will not exceed  the
landed  cost  of imported  components  by more than 15%.  Presuming
that the landed  cost  includes  import  duties  paid,  and  given  the
tariff  rates  for  passenger  vehicle  and commercial  vehicle  kitp,
this regulation  would  imply  that  domestic  components  cannot  exceed
imported  components  cost  by more than 38.6  per cent for  commercial
vehicles  or 49.5  per cent  for  passenger  vehicles. For the
purposes  of the  estimates  in this  paper,  pending  more accurate
estimates  nf  is set  equal  to these  numbers.
tA  Tariff  on assembled  vehicles.
As of 1991,  the tariff  rates  on assembled  vehicles  weres




Source: World  Bank
For commerical  vehicles  the figure  used  was 46,  the  weighted
average  across  jeeps,  trucks  and  buses,  using  1990 sales  (CRC,
1991,  Table  3.6)  as weights.
tK  Tariff  on kits.
In 1990,  the  tariff  rates  on kit imports  for  motor  vehicle
assembly  were:
Passenger  cars  30  (1991)
Asian  Utility  Vehicles  20
Trucks  20
Buses  3023
Sources: AUV,  trucks,  and buses:  CRC, 1991,  Table  4.10.
Passenger  cars:  World  Bank
To aggregate  to estimate  average  tariff  on commercial  vehicles,
the  weighted  average  tariff  using  1990  production  (CRC,  1991,
Table  3.6)  as  weights. The resulting  average  tariff  for
commercial  vehicles  was  20.54.
6  Percentage  of components  that  must  be sourced  locally.
CDP:  In 1990  the  Car Development  Program  requ.ired  local  content
of 40%.
CVDPs  The local  content  requirements  for  commercial  vehicles
varied  by category  as shown  in Table  1.  A weighted  average  of the
local  content  requirements  by category,  weighted  by 1990
production  by category,  was calculated  using  data  on output  by
type  of vehicle  (CRC,  1991,  Table  3.6).  The resulting  average  6
was 41.5%.
XK  Compensatory  export  requirement  for  kits.
CDP:  The  compensatory  export  requirement  for importe  of kits  to
assemble  passenger  vehicles  is 50%.  The  requirement  that  exports
be automotive  products  is being  phased  in.  In 1990,  40%  of the
compensatory  exports  had  to be auto industry  products. Thus  the
effective  requirement  for  exports  of auto  industry  products  was
20%.
CVDP:  The  compensatory  export  requirement  for  imports  of  kits  to
assemble  commercial  vehicles  is  25%.  The  phase-in  of  the
requirement  that  exports  be auto  industry  products  reached  40% in
1990,  which  implies  an effective  compensatory  export  requirement
of  auto  industry  parts  of  10%.
a  Ratio  of components  cost  to final  cost  of vehicle.
For  commercial  vehicles,the  value  was set  at 0.74,  calculated  as a
weighted  average  (weighted  by production)  of the  ratio  for  trucks
(.743)  and  buses(.690). In  the absence  of specific  information
for  passenger  vehicles,  the same  value  was  used.
Sources:The  figures  for  trucks  and  buses  were  calculated  from  data
on CKD kits  and  local  components  as  a  percentage  of  ex-factory
prices  from  CRC,  1991,  p.  10.
VA  Value  of Vehicle  production.
Source: Board  of Investments  (1991)  Annex  B.  Prices  are  unit
values  calculated  from  the  value  and  quantity  data.
QA  Quantity  of vehicles  assembled.
Source:  Board  of Investments  (1991)  Annex  B.
PA  Price  of assembled  vehicle.
Source: Average  price  of a  vehicle  as calculated  from  value  and
quantity  data in Board  of Investments  (1991)  Annex  B.
Vc  Value  of components  production.
2,452  million  pesos  under  CDP  and 1,047  million  pesos  under  CVDP
for  1990.
Estimated  as the  sum  of purchases  of local  parts  and components  by
assembly  firms  (1,596  million  pesos  under  CDP and  697  million
pesos  under  CVDP  in 1990) (BO, Annex  B, Table  10)  and  portion  of
estimated  compensatory  exports  (88  million  dollars  under  CDP and
36 million  dollars  under  CVDP in 1990 (BOI,  Annex  B, Table  6)  made
up of auto industry  products  (40%  for  both  CDP  and  CVDP),
converted  at 1990  average  exchange  rate of 24.311  pesos/US$  (IMF,24
International  Financial  Statistics) Does  not include  manufacture
of replacement  parts.
VDA  Elasticity  of demand  for  assembled  motor  vehicles
Assumed  equal  to 1 for  preliminary  calculations
'eSA  Elasticity  of supply  of value-added  in  motor  vehicle  assembly
Assumed  equal  to 1 for  preliminary  calculations
6sc  Elasticity  of supply  of components  industry




CAR DEVELOPMENT  PROGRAM
32.26  36.58  40.00
COMMERCIAL VEHICLE DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM
Category I  43.1  51.2  54.8
Category II  35.6  41.6  44.4
Category III  16.8  20.3  21.9
Category IV
6001-9000  kg.  16.5  19.9  21.4
9001-12000  kgo  17.1  20.6  22.2
12001-15000 kgs  10.7  12.6  13.5
15001-18000 kg.  10.9  12.9  13.826
TABLE 2
COMPENSATORY  EXPORT REQUIREMENTS
CAR DEVELOPMENT  PROGRAM  (CDP)  50%
COMMERCIAL  VEHICLE  DEVELOPMENT  PROGRAM (CVDP)  25%
Percentage  Implicit  Implicit
Automotive  Requirement  Requirement
Required  CDP  CVDP
1988  0  0  0
1989  20  10  5
1990  40  20  10
1991  60  30  15
1992  80  40  20
1993  100  50  2527
TABLE 3
DATA USED IN CALCULATIONS OF IMPACT OF
MOTOR VEHICLE PROTECTIVE REGIME
Variable  Units  AUTOMOBILES  COMMERCIAL VEHICLES
*  0.527  0.527
iX  0.495  0.386
tA  0.50  0.46
tK  0.30  0.205
XK  0.20  0.10
a  0.40  0.415
PA  pesos  231,913  223,636
QA  units  34,431  22,076
VA  millions  7,985  4,937
of pesos
a  0.740  0.740
VC  millions  3,008  1,570
of pesos28
TABLE 4
MOTOR VEHICLE INDUSTRY PROTECTION IN THE PHILIPPINES
Gains and Losses from Protective Regime (1990)
(Millions  of Pesos)
AUTOMOBILES  COMMERCIAL VEHICLES  TOTAL
Consumer Loss  3,231  1,997  5,228
(abcd)
Efficiency Lose  476  294  770
(Consumption)
(bcg)
Transfer to Assembly  955  831  1,786
Industry
(nfqd)
Efficiency Los  108  148  256
(Assembled  Autos)
(fgq)
Transfer to Components  831  376  1,207
Industry
(ijml)
Efficiency Loss  165  60  225
(Components)
(Jkm)
Total Transfer  1,786  1#207  2,993
to Producers
(nfqd+ijml)
Total Efficiency Loss  749  502  1,251
(bcg+fgq+jkm)
Tariff Revenue  0.020  0.013
Consumer Cost per  93,840  90,506
Unit Assembled  (pesos)
Efficiency Loss per  21,754  22,740
Unit Assembled  (pesos)29
TABLE 5
IMPACT OF PROTECTION AT PREVAILING TARIFF RATES ONLY (1990)
(Millions  of Pesos)
COMMERCIAL
AUTOMOBILES  VEHICLES  TOTAL
Consumer Loss  3,089  1,776  4,865
(rncd)
Efficiency Lois  428  224  652
(Consumption)
(ucg)
Transfer to Assembly  1,322  847  2,169
Industry
(wuqd)
Efficiency Loss  202  154  356
(Assembly)
(uvq)
Transfer to Components  464  185  629
Industry
(xyml)
Efficiency Loss  61  17  78
(Components)
(YZm)
Total Transfer to  1,787  1,032  2,819
Producers
(wuqd+xyml)
Total Efficiency  691  395  1,086
Loos
(scg+uvq+yzm)
Tariff Revenue  1,136  552  1,688
Consumer Loss per  87,027  74,560
Vehicle Assembled
EfficLency Loss per  20,069  10,147
Vehicle  AssembledFIGURE 1
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